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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LYNN A. JENKINS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. C-78-5035

Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
UTAH LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL,
Third-Party Intervenor.
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE,
UTAH EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by a private citizen against the State
of Utah challenging the lawfulness of legislation enacted by
the 1977-78 Utah Legislature and further challenging the right
of persons employed by boards of education to serve in the Utah
Legislature.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment holding that the laws enacted by the 1977-78 Utah Legislature
and that the revenues collected were lawful and that educators
could not serve in the Utah legislature.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Amicus requests that this Court find that the trial court
lacked
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the issues were improperly brought in the district court and
that educators are not constitutionally prohibited from serving in the legislature.
STATE!lENT OF FACTS
On or about August 9, 1978, Lynn A. Jenkins filed a Complaint against the State of Utah alleging, among other things,
that employees of the Utah public schools had been elected and
had served in the 1977-78 state legislatures and that Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution of Utah provides in part that
"No person holding any public office of profit or trust under
authority of.

.this state, shall be a member of the Legislature;

The prayer for relief requested:
1.

That "All laws passed by the 1977-78 Utah State Legisla-

ture shall be declared null and void."
2.

That "All money collected by virtue of laws which are

declared null and void shall be returned to the people."
3.

That the

Le~islature

shall certify all their membership

to be constitutionally correct.

Those members of the Legislature

which cannot certify shall forfeit any and all benefit which the
office of Legislator holds.
4.

"For costs and disbursements of this action."

5.

"For such other and further relief as the court seems

just in the premises."
Following the State of Utah's Hotion for Summary Judgment
held August 30, 1978, the district court held that the la\,'S e:.acted by the 1977-78 legislature were valid, that lhc revenues
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school administrators could not serve in the Utah legislature.
The State of Utah appealed the District Court's judgment
that school teachers and administrators cannot lawfully serve
in the Utah Legislature, although Amicus is unable to understand
how the State of Utah has become a proper party defendant to
represent educators whose right to be elected by the voters of
Utah has been challenged.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING BEFORE THE COURTS.
Mr. Jenkins alleged that he is a resident of Salt Lake County.
Mr. Jenkins does not allege that he is a taxpayer.

There is no

allegation that Mr. Jenkins is represented in the Utah legislature
by a person employed by a public school or that his voting privileges are affected by the candidacy of such person.
59 Am Jur 2d, Parties, §30 provides:
Public wrongs or neglect or breach of
public duty generally cannot be redressed at
a suit in the name of an individual or individuals
whose interest in the right asserted does not
differ from that of the public generally, or who
suffers injury only in common with the public
generally, and not peculiar to himself, even, it
seems, though his loss is greater in degree,
unless such right of action is given by statute.
The broad general principle is asserted that
in the absence of a statute imposing liability,
an action will not lie in behalf of an individual
who has sustained a prlvate injury by reason of the
neglect of a public corporation to perform a
public duty. When the duty of taking appropriate
action for the enforcement of a statute is entrusted
solely to a named public officer, private citizens
cannot intrude upon his functions.
In cases of
purely public concern and in actions for wrongs
against the public, whether actually committed or
only apprehended, the remedy, whether civil or
Sponsored
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Funding for digitization
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instituted by the state in its political character,
or by some officer authorized by law to act in its
behalf, or by some of those local agencies created by
the state for the arrangement as may be entrusted to
them by law.
If a mere public right is to be vindicated,
or enforcement or evasion of a law is to be restrained,
the action should be brought by the attorney general or
district attorney, or some public officer or body especially charged with the duty of enforcing the law.
The
right of a citizen or taxpayer to restrain acts of public officials is in some instances granted or regulated
by statute, but ordinarily, and in the absence of statute, private citizens or corporations must possess
something more than a con®on concern for obedience to
law before they will be permitted to maintain injunction
suits against public officers. A private person who
wishes to restrain an official different in character
from that sustained by the public generally, although
there is an exception in regard to taxpayers' action.

* * *
It is, however, only when the injury from the
violation of a public duty is general and public in
its effect, and no private right, in contradistinction
to the rights of the rest of the public, is violated,
that individuals are precluded from bringing private
suit for the violation of their individual rights.
When an individual or a private citizen suffers an injury peculiar to himself from a public wrong which is
not sustained by the public in general, he may sue in
his own name and for his own benefit for such wrong.

In Jenkins v. State of lJtah, Plaintiff does not allege that
he ':las any special interest to protect or that he has suffen'J
any unique injury.

lndeed, he appears to seek redress of a prG-

blem reserved by the Constltution of Utah to

th~

Legisl3ture.

See Point IV below.
74 Am Jur 2d, Taxpayers Actions, §46 orovides:
A taxpayer may not maintain a petition for
declaratory judgment to question the eliqibility
of 3 candidate for, or thn title of, an oFfice.
An action rclatinq to election r:t:.ttcrs

C(lnqot

l>t.' ~alnt,,tt:

by one ·,,hose Jnterest c_s onl:· that of the r"Jbl o::: dCncr."lll·: in
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the absence of a statute authorizing the action.
281

Yett v. Cook,

s .w. 837 (Tex. 1926).
A private citizen may not maintain an election contest in

his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer.

Freemen v. Felts,

344 S.W. 2d 550 (Tenn. 1961); Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169
(5th Cir. 1972) cert. den. 410 U.S. 910 (1973).
The right to contest office of mayor held by the apparent
winner lies only in the defeated candidate.
l~aterville,

Marden v. City of

226 A.2d 369 (Me. 1967).

In Porter v. Bainbridge, 465 F. Supp. 83 (D.C.Ind. 1975) the
court held that the challenge to the election of a person to the
Indiana House of Representatives was "in essence a contest between
two opposing candidates for a section in the Indiana House of
Representatives.

.accordingly plaintiffs Porter and Zinuners,

who claim an interest in the case only in their capacity as
voters, lack standing to maintain the action under the principles
of Schlesinger v. Reservists' Committee to Stop lvar, 418 U.S. 208
.and Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 .... "
The issue before the court is really a back-door effort to
bring an election contest of the right and qualification of a
certain class of persons to serve in the Utah legislature.

Elec-

tion contests are regulated by the Constitution or by statute.
26 Am Jur 2d, Elections, §31.

Section 20-15-1, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, sets forth nine grounds to contest the "election of any person
to any public office, or in the case of a primary, to a nomination."
Subsection (2) of section 20-15-1 provides that an election may be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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contested "When incumbent was not eligible to the office at the
time of the election."

The pleadings in Jenkins v. State of Utah

do not allege and there are no facts before the court showing that
there are candidates for election to the state legislature not
eligible to secure as state legislators at the time of their
election.

Moreover, the statute clearly indicates that the con-

test must be brought after the election.

In the Jenkins case,

the matter was brought before the election.
POINT II
THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION AS THE
"STATE OF UTAH" HAS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN THIS CASE AND THERE \'/ERE NO PROPER
PARTY DEFENDANTS.
Amicus submits that the persons whose interests to this
matter would be affected, i.e., educators, have never been
made a party.

Moreover, although the State of Utah by and

through the office of the Attorney General have not raised
the issue, the State of Utah is neither a proper party nor
may it be a party defendant.
Unfortunately, the impetus to this action is a $50,000,000
bond issue which appears to have been stalled as a result of
this action.

Amicus submits that lf the validity of the bends

are at issue, the proper course of action would be to have the
governor sue the state treasurer raising the issues raised in
the Jenkins suit.
A.

The State of Utah is sovereign and is irmnune to process.

Rule 4 (e) ( 9) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provldc:s t 1 ,at
Sponsored by
the S.J.
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cases as by law are authorized to be brought against the state .... "
There is no law authorizing the type of action which was brought
against the State of Utah by Mr. Jenkins.

Accordingly, the dis-

trict court acquired no jurisdiction on which to enter a judgment.
In Campbell v. Pack, 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 (1964) this
Court held that the activities, operations and contracts of state
government have sovereign immunity.

While the attorney general

has entered his appearance in Jenkins v. State of Utah, his appearance does not constitute a waiver of immunity.

In Bailey Servlce

and Supply Corp. v. State By and Through State Road Commission,
533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975) this court held that only the leglslature
could waive sovereign immunity.

The Court may take judicial notice

of lack of jurisdiction and improper parties.
412

u.s.
B.

Bruno v. Kenosha,

507 (1974).
Rule l7(a) in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires

that "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest."

In this case only the State of Utah was

served or made a defendant.

Subsequently, the Office of Legis-

lative Counsel intervened, but no teacher or school administrator
was ever made a party.

Horeoever, not until the State's Motion

for Summary Judgment, at the direction of the trial court judge,
did thl' [-'rayer for relief becorr.L' a"'ended to request a decision

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on whether or not educators may serve in the legislature.l/
Although the State has not previously objected to jurisdiction for the reasons suggested in this Point II, it is submitted
that this Court may take notice of the lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional defects can be raised at any time.
Elections, §328.

Bruno v. City of Kenosha,

26 Am Jur 2d,

412 U.S. 507 (1974).

POINT III
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ADMINISTRATORS
ARE NOT OFFICERS IHTHIN THE MEANING
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 6, OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
No person holding any public office of profit or
trust under authority of the United States, or of this
State shall be a member of the Legislature; provided,
that appointments in the State Militia, and the offices
of notary public, justice of the peace, United States
commissioner, and postmaster of the fourth class, shall
not within the meaning of this section be considered
offices of profit or trust.
A.

This Court has never decided whether a school teacher

holds an "office" of profit or trust within the meaning of the
constitutional language.
1/ At page 16 of the Transcript the court states, "Now, I don't
understand about- I am not sure I understand Paragraph 3."
"Legis·lature shall certify all their membership to be constitutionally
correct." I1t page 17 of the Transcript the Court states, "And
with reaard to the fourth issue, while as I have indicated I have
some do~bts as to what the Supreme Court will decide, I am going to
hold that a school teacher does hold an office of profit trustor an educator-and therefore cannot be seated in the Legislature."
Plaintiff's fourth prayer for relief was for "costs and disbursements of this action." Even if an educator had received a copy
of the Jenkins Complaint the educator would not have known that
the Complaint requested that educators b<? determined inellgiblEc
to serve in the legislature.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In an unreported case styled Davie v. Messinger, No. 8272
(1954)

this Court dismissed an action brought by the defeated

candidate for a seat in the Utah House of Representatives.

Davie

had challenged the qualification of Messinger on the ground that
Messinger was the clerk of the board of education of the Beaver
County School District.

The pleadings show that Mr. Messinger

had alleged grounds as to why his occupation as clerk of the
school board did not disqualify him.

First, he argued he was

not holding an office of profit or trust.

Second, the Legisla-

ture was the sole and exclusive judge of the qualifications of
its

members.

Unfortunately, the minute entry of the court does

not indicate the basis of its

decision to dismiss Davies

In Eliason v. Miller et al., No. 13130,

petition.~/

(Utah 1972), an unreported

case, petitioner, the defeated candidate in an election for membership on the Utah State School Board, sought to prohibit the certification of Steven L. Garrett from serving on the Utah State School
Board for the reason that Mr. Garrett held an incompatible office,
i.e., he was an educator employed by the Iron County School District
at the time of his election and therefore the office to which he ~ad

2/ A clerk of a board of education is an office established by
statute, §53-6-3, Uta~ Code Annotated, is bonded, Id. at §53-6-4 and
takes an oath of office.
Id. at §53-6-6.
It woul~appear under the
criteria below suggested byAmicus that Hessinger was an "officer".
of the board.
Accordingly, the Court must have concluded that Artlcle VI, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah reserved to the Leglslature the jurisdiction to determine the election and qualification
of the membership.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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been elected was incompatible with his office as an educator.
Mr. Garrett argued that a school teacher is not an "officer"
but rather an "employee" and that constitutional limitations
regarding eligibility for public office should be strictly
construed in favor of eligibility.

This Court dismissed Mrs.

Eliason's petition for EXtra Ordinary 1\Tri t.
Amicus submits that a school teacher is not an office of
trust or profit within the meaning of the Constitution.

At

35 \-lords and Phrases, Public Officers, page 405 there are many
cases holding that a school trustee, a member of the school
board or a school committee are public officers.

There is a

split of authority as to whether superintendents are public
officers or employees.

Compare Rowan v. Board of Education of

Logan County, 24 S.E.2d 583 (W. Va. 1943) with State ex rel.
Harvey v. Stanley, 138 So. 845 (La. 1931).
In Malone v. Hayden, 197 A. 344

(Pa.l938) the court held

that a school teacher is not a public officer within the meaning of the constitutional provision prohibiting the creation of
any office the appointment to which shall be for a longer term
than of any "public office" after his election or appointment
since the duties of school teachers are not created by statute,
but rise strictly from their employment contracts.

It is generally

held that a school teacher is an employee and not a public
Gelson v. Berry, 250 N.Y.S. 577

(1931); Regents

(.)f

of~Jccr,

University S:,·s-

tem of Georgia v. Blanton, 176 S.E. 673 (Ga ..Z\pp.l934); Co[)l_c_·_·Metal Tp. School District, 3 Cumb. 43 (Pa. 1955);

78 C.J.S.
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:Cch>OL

B.

The courts have distinguished an officer from an

employee.
In Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 383 S.W.2d
806 (Tex.Civ.App.l964), the Court held that the determining
factor which distinguishes public officers from employees is
whether any sovereign function of government is conferred on
the individual to be exercised by him for the public largely
independent of the control of others.
In Romney v. Barlow, 24 Utah 2d 226, 469 P.2d 497 (1970),
this court considered the definition of "civil office."

It

noted that Black's Law Dictionary defines "civil office" as:
An office, not merely military in its nature,
that pertains to the exercise of the powers of authority of civil government.
Requisites are continuity,
creation and definition of powers and duties by Constitution or Legislature, or their authority, possession
or governmental power, and independence unless controlled
by superior officers.
The Court then analyzed the creation and membership of the
legislative council as follows:
1.

The Council was created by the Legislature.

2.

Members had a definite tenure, to wit, until

the convening of the next regular session of the Legislature following the appointment.
3.

The duties of the Council are set forth by the

Legislature.
4.

The Council is given power to administer oaths,

issue subpoenas, compel attendance of witness and to
take testimony.
5.

The Council performs its work according to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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its own rules and regulations independent of any

supervision.
6.

The Council possesses governmental powers.

Based on the foregoing test, the Court concluded that membership on the Council constituted holding a public office.
Educators, by contrast, possess almost none of the foregoing.
The position of teachers is not created by statute.

Section

53-4-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
Board of education of local school districts
may enter into written contracts for the employment of personnel for terms not to exceed five years ....
In Brough v. Board of Education, 23 Utah 2d 174, 460 P.2d
336 (1969) and 23 Utah 2d 353, 463 P.2d 567 (1970)

this court

made clear that a school teacher is entirely subject to the
control and direction of the board of education and the district
superintendent and that a school teacher who attempts to centrovert the policies of the school district may be terminated for
i:-csc.illo:cdination absent a showing that the board's action was not

School teachers do not have definite terms of office, but
may acquire tenure according to the policies of local boards of
education.

Abbott v. Board of I:ducation 558 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1977).

Nor do teachers and lov1er level "administrators" take or subscr ~.be
to an oath of office or post a bond.
Based on the foregoing,

it is clear that school teachers ana

school administrators are not officers of thr_' State of r·cah cr
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of the school district.

Indeed, if school teachers were

found to be officers, they could not be fired except by a
vote of four or more members of a five member board of education.
C.

Section 53-6-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Article IV, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah

provides in part that:
All officers made elective or appointive by the
Constitution or by the laws made in pursuance thereof,
before entering upon the duties of their respective
offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath
or affirmation.
Petitioner respectfully submits that the criteria of taking
an oath of office was foremost in the minds of the drafters of
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution of Utah.

Article VI,

Section 6 prohibits persons holding a public office of profit
or trust under the United States or the State of Utah from serving in the Utah Legislature.

Excepted from that prohibition are

appointments in the state militia, notaries public, justices of
the peace, United States commissioners and postmasters of the
fourth class.
Pursuant to the Territorial Laws of Utah, 1888, commissioners
and notaries public were required to take and subscribe to the
oath of office.
2 31.

Territorial Laws of Utah, 1888, §§225, 227 and

Justices of the peace were elected and had to take the oath

of office.

Id. at §162.

The officers of the state militia were appointed by the governor,
Id. at §1436, except that field officers of battalions and regiments
v.·ere elected.

Id. ~t §1439.

All commissioned officers were required

at §1440.
to "take
and
the
required
oath.by the Institute ofId.
Sponsored by
the S.J.subscribe
Quinney Law Library.
Funding
for digitization provided
Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

Section 1854 of the Territorial Laws, p.54 provides in
part:
.no person holding a commission or appointment under the United States, except postmasters,
shall be a member of the Legislat.ive Assembly, or
shall hold any office under the government of any
Territory.
Amicus submits under the principal of

noscitur a sociis,

the five offices listed in section 6 of Article VI of the
Constitution of Utah show that the word "office" is intended
to mean persons appointed by the president of the United
States, the governor of Utah or holding elected office all
of whom took an oath of office and filed a bond.

Moreover,

the offices of each was expressly established by statute as
an "office."
Amicus submits that given the legislative background, educators were not intended to be included within the prohibition
of Article VI, §6 of the Constitution of Utah as they are net
appointed by the president of the United States, the governor
of Utah and they are not elected by the people.
The lower court entirely relied on
No. l,

Clackamas.~ounty,

315 P.2d 797

Mo~3ghan

(Ore.l977)

v. School District
for the propDsltlOr

that an educator holds an office of profit or trust.

Y:::t

l''o~~

Supra at 315 P.2d 80l holds:
We are inhibited from passing upon ~r. Monaghan's
qualificat1ons as a member of the legislature.
That
power reposes exclusively in the branch of the lcnislative assembly to w''lich he was electccl to serve.
(Oregon Constitution, Art. IV, §2) ....
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"''l'L,

Article IV, §2 of the Oregon Constitution is substantially the
same as Article VI, §10 of the Constitution of Utah.
D.

Article VI, Section 6, of the Constitution of Utah is

a limitation of the right of otherwise qualified persons to
serve in the Utah Legislature.

It is also a limitation of the

right of the people to vote for the person they believe can
best represent them in the legislature.

In State v. DuBuque,

413 P.2d 972(1966), the court held that where eligibility for
public office is in question and where the constitution and the
context of the language permits, those provisions should be
construed so as to preserve eligibility.
In Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 (1964)
this court held that:
The foundation and structure which give it
(government) life depend upon participation of the
citizenry in all aspects of it's operation. On
patriotic occasions we hear a great deal of oratory
declaiming how precious is the right and how essential is the duty to vote for the candidate of one's
choice.
The emphasis is placed on the first clausethe right to vote; and the second clause-for the
candidate of one's choice, is minimized or forgotten.
Lost sight of is the fact that the two rights are
correlative, and that to make the first meaningful,
the second must also be assured.
Furthermore, the
natural corollary of the right to vote is the right
to seek and to serve in public office.
Petitioner submits that the issue of whether or not an ed~cator should serve the people in the Utah legislature is a
political questlon.

If the public does not want educators to

represent them, they can vote for other candidates.

Candidates

for the
legislature have ''full exposure to public view, and.
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have full exposure to the elective process.

Months before

suit was filed they had announced their candidacies for
office.

They had to run before and obtain the approval of

the conventions of their respective parties.

They were

obliged to run in the public primaries against formidable
opponents; and must face candidates of the opposing party
in the general election.

All of this with the public fully

aware of all of the circumstances so they are free to approve
or disapprove what the candidates have done."
Toronto, 16 Utah 2d at 65.

Shields v.

Amicus submits that the issues

raised by Mr. Jenkins should be resolved by the electorate,
not by the courts.
E.

The Court's attention is directed to Utah Attorney

Opinion 72-038 which states in part:
An opinion of the Attorney General issued Jan.
10, 1961 and nu~her 61-006, covers this question:
"It should be noted that what is prohibited by
Sec. 6, Art. IV is the holding of 'public office
of profit or tru3t,' while serving in the legislature.
.In an earlier opinion of the Attorney
General, Feb. 29, 1944, it was said that the constitutional prohibition applies only to officers
and not to employees. Although this is probably
more general than intended, it is essentially correct.
Unless t.he person holds 'an office' as distinct from mere employnent the proh1bition of Art.
VI is inapplicable.
.crnployntent as a te<1chcr.
would not be within t~e constitutional prohibition.
From this we must conclude in aeneral terms that tho
consitutional prohibition set ~ut in Art. VI, Sec. 6
of our State Constitution applies only to persons
holding public office, which based on the facts of each
case, must be distingulshed fror.1 mere employees."
Under the foregoing we see no compelling reason why a
school teacher cannot be a rT.embcr of the Lcc,islaturr.· a:.;
far as 1\rt. VT, Sec. Go:': t!E• t'l:lh Constitution is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

concerned.
F.

Amicus further anticipates that this court will be

urged on the basis of Monaghan, supra, to find that educators who are elected to the legislature are not eligible to
continue their employment as educators.

It is submitted

that this issue was not raised by the plaintiff in the court
below and it should not now be considered by this court for
the first time on appeal.

State By and Through Road Commission,

27 Utah 2d 295, 482 P.2d 702 (1972); In re Ekker's Estate, 19
Utan 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d
358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967).
Moreover, amicus submits that Utah educators occupy a
relationship to the executive department substantially different than that of Oregon educators.
Before this court addresses the issues raised by Monaghan,
there should be proper parties and the issues should be fully
developed.

In distinguishing Monaghan, the Utah Attorney Gen-

er3l suggests among other reasons:
Only if its reasoning is compelling then
would it influence a similiar decision in
Utah.
It could be argued that there is,
in fact, more weicht in the "unwritten
precedent," which-tacitly endorses the
employment of legislators as public
school teachers.
Op. ,'\ttj". Gen. 72-038.
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G.

\~hile

it was not raised in the pleadings below,

Amicus anticJ.pates th:ot it ::1ay be urged that Article VI,
§6 of the Constitution of Utah is a general prohibition
on conflicts of interest.

Had the drafters of the con-

stitution intended a prohibition on conflicts of interest,
the language would have extended to include employees of
the state and would not have excepted the five named classes
of officers.

It has been suggested that retired educators

have a conflict of interest and should not serve in the legislature.

There are 76,000 retirees participating in the

Utah State Retirement program.

There are at least 20,000

persons employed by higher education.

Amicus submits that

any effort to extend the exclusions of Article VI, §6 of the
Constitution of Utah to conflicts of interest would eliminate
from eligibility for service in the Utah legislature a group
of people large in number than the number of votes case for
the candidate elected governor in Utah in 1976.
ARGUHENT
POINT IV
EACH HOUSE OF THE LEGISLATURE IS THE EXCLUSIVE
HOUSE TO DETERHI~E THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION
OF ITS MEMBERS.
Amicus respectfully submits that the courts do not have
jurisdiction to decJ.de

t~e

qualifications or election of mem-

bers to the Utah legislature.

Article VI, §10 of the Consti-

tution of Ctah provides in part:
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"Each house shall be the judge of the
election and qualifications of its members.
This issue was set to rest early in Utah law in the case
of Ellison v. Barnes, 23 Utah 183, 63 Pac. 899 (1901).

There

an action was brought contesting the election of the respondent
to the office of state senator.

A demurrer to the complaint

was sustained by the trial court on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction to try and determine the same.

The Supreme

Court in a decision per Justice Baskin, with Chief Justice
Miner and Justice Bartch concurring, upheld the lower court's
decision explaining:
The powers conferred upon each house of the legislature under section 10, art. 6, are forbidden to be
exercised, by article 5, §l, by any person in the
exercise of powers belonging to a different department of the government.
Neither is it anywhere declared
in the constitution that the power conferred upon each
house to judge of the election and the qualifications
of its members is otherwise than prohibitory in respect
to the other departments.
Chief Justice Bartch, in
the opinion in the case of Kimball v. City of Grantsville
19 Utah, 368, 57 Pac. 1, 45 L.R.A. 628, said, "The
apportionment of distince power to one department of
itself implies an inhibition against its exercise by
either of the other departments." It therefore follows
that the power is e~clus~vely lodged in each house of
t!1e lcglslature, and the roGrts have no jurisaict1on to
trv and determine contests for seats in the legislature.

* * *
The power thus given to the houses of the legislature is a judicial power, and each house acts in a
judicial capacity when it exerts it.
The express
vesting of a judicial power in a particular case so
closely and vitally affecting the body to whom that
power is given takes it out of the general judicial
power, which is at the same time, in pursuance of a
general plan that has reaard in each part to every
other part, bestowed upon another body; both bodies
being contemporaneous in origin, and equal in dignity,
degree, and proposed duration." The senate, under.
the provisions of the constitution, has the excluslve
jurisdiction to trv, deter~ine, and declare which of
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This concept is not unique to Utah, but rather, constitutes
the generally accepted approach by other jurisdictions.
Each house is the sole judge of the election and qualification
of its members.

Burge v. Tibor, 397 P.2d 235 (Idaho 1964); Harris

v. Shanahan, 387 P.2d 771 (Kan. 1963).
The state constitutional provision that each House shall
judge the qualifications, elections and returns of its own members deprives the state courts of jurisdiction to decide contests
for state legislative offices.

Laxalt v. Cannon, 397 P.2d 466

(Nev. 1964); In re McGee, 226 P.2d 1,

(Cal. 1951), remittitur

amended 229 P. 2d 780 (Cal. 1951); Monaghan v. School Dist. No.
1, Clackamas County, 315 P.2d 797 (Ore. 1957).
72 Am Jur 2d, States, §44 provides:
The constitutions of most, if not all,
of the states contain provisions to the effect
that each house in the state legislature shall
be the judge of the election and qualifications
of its own members. Such a declaration is a
grant of power and constitutes each house the
ultimate tribunal c3 to the qualifications o:
lts own members. The two houses acting conjointly do not decide, but each house acts for
itself and by itself, and from its decision
there is no appeal, not even to the two houses.
This power is not exhausted when once it has
been exercised and a member admitted to his
seat; it is, on the contrary, a continuous power,
and at all times during the term of office, each
house is empowered to pass on the present qualifications of its own members. The power extends to
determining the absence of disqualifications, as
well as the presence of qualifications.

* * *
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It is well settled that a constitutional
provision of this kind vests the legislature
with sole and exclusive power over the matters
covered and deprives the courts of jurisdiction.
And any action or decision taken by a house of
the legislature in the exercise of this power
is final and conclusive and not subject to
review or revision by the courts.
To the same effect, see 81A C.J.S. States §44 and 107 A.L.R.
209, which concludes:
The constitutions of most if not all,
of the states contain provisions similar
to Art. 1, §5, of the Federal Constitution,
to the effect that each house of the state
legislature shall be the judge of the election
and qualifications of its own members. And it
is well settled that such a provision vests the
legislature with sole and exclusive power in
this regard, and deprives the courts of jurisdiction of those matters.
This concept remains in force even where the courts may feel
that the legislative decision is wrong in a given case.

Raney

v. Stovall, 361 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1962).
Amicus respectfully submits that the Courts are without
jurisdiction to hear or determine the subject matter raised
-~

Jenkins v. State of

~tan

and

t~at.

the determination of the

qualifications of the legislators of this state is solely and
exclusivelv within the jurisdiction of the respective houses

c:

the

leglslatur~.

CONCLUSIONS
l.

Plaintiff has no standing to bring this suit.

2.

There was no proper party defendant as the State of

Utah has immunity and the State of Utah, as such, is not the
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real party in interest to defend the right of educators
to serve in the legislature.
3.

School teachers and educators are not "officers"

within the prohibition of the meaning of Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution of Utah.
4.

The Constitution of Utah specifically reserves to

each House of the Legislature the authority to determine
the election and qualifications of its membership.
5.

The real impetus for this suit is the problem it

creats in marketing the state's bonds.

Amicus suggests

that the Court hold that even if Plaintiff could show that
certain members of the legislature were not properly qualified, the determination by the legislature that its members
were elected and qualified is conclusive and the laws enacted
by the legislature were lawfully enacted and not void by the
reasons suggested by Plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted this _1_0_"_~_-_day of September,
1978.

HICHAEL T. McCOY
Attorney for Amicus
Curiae, Utah Education
Association
414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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